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Abstract—A Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET) is a special
form of Mobile Ad-hoc Network designed to provide communi-
cations among nearby vehicles and between vehicles and nearby
fixed roadside equipment. Its main goal is to improve safety and
comfort for passengers, but it can also be used for commercial
applications. In this latter case, it will be necessary to motivate
drivers to cooperate and contribute to packet forwarding in
Vehicle-to-Vehicle and Vehicle-to-Roadside communications. This
paper examines the problem, analyzes the drawbacks of known
schemes and proposes a new secure incentive scheme to stimulate
cooperation in VANETs, taking into account factors such as time
and distance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are important compo-
nents of Intelligent Transportation Systems. The main benefit
of VANET communication is seen in active safety systems that
increase passenger safety by exchanging warning messages
between vehicles. Other promising commercial applications
are Added-Value Services such as: advertising support [6],
request/provide information about nearby companies, access
to Internet, etc.
A VANET may be seen as a special type of ad-hoc network
used to provide communications between On-Board Units
(OBUs) in nearby vehicles, and between OBUs in vehicles and
Road-Side Units (RSUs), which are fixed equipment located
on the road. In particular, this paper deals with the topic of
Inter-Vehicle Communication when the systems in a VANET
do not rely on RSUs, and consequently constitute a Mobile
Ad-hoc Network (MANET).
The main advantage of VANETs is that they do not need
an expensive infrastructure. However, their major drawback is
the comparatively complex networking management system
and security protocols that are required. This difficulty is
mainly due to some specific characteristics of VANETs that
allow differentiating them from the rest of MANETs such
as their hybrid architecture, high mobility, dynamic topology,
scalability problems, and intermittent and unpredictable com-
munications. Consequently, these features have to be taken into
account when designing any management service or security
protocol.
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In order to bring VANETs to their full potential, appropri-
ate schemes to stimulate cooperation need to be developed
according to the specific properties and potential applications
of VANETs. Many incentive schemes to stimulate cooperation
in ad-hoc networks may be found in the bibliography [5] [9]
[10] [11]. Some authors have made first approaches to the
topic of cooperation in VANETs [3] [4] [12] [13]. Related to
the proposal here described, Buttyan and Hubaux proposed in
[1] and [2] the use of virtual credit in incentive schemes to
stimulate packet forwarding. Also, Li et al. discussed some
unique characteristics of the incentive schemes for VANETs
in [7] and proposed a receipt counting reward scheme that
focuses on the incentive for spraying. However, the receipt
counting scheme proposed there has a serious overspending
problem. Based on the specific characteristics of VANETs, a
more comprehensive weighted rewarding method is proposed
here.
In particular, the proposed scheme is based on incentives
where the behavior of a node is rewarded depending on its
level of involvement in the routing process. Schemes based
on reputation were here discarded due to the high mobility
of nodes in VANETs, which makes infeasible to maintain
historical information about peers behavior.
Note that an important problem that must be dealt with
in rewarding incentive schemes is the possibility for selfish or
malicious users in the vehicles to exaggerate their contribution
in order to get more rewards. In our proposal, we assign
different possible incentives to vehicles according to their con-
tribution in packet forwarding, in an effort to achieve fairness
and provide stimulation for participation. Our scheme utilizes a
weighted rewarding component to decide the specific incentive
in each case so they help to keep the packet forwarding
attractive to the potential intermediate vehicles.
II. BACKGROUND
A VANET may be seen as a variation of a MANET where
the nodes are vehicles. In both types of networks, cooperation
between nodes is required for the adequate performance, so
there might be thought that cooperation tools for MANETs
can be also used for VANETs. In MANETs we can find two
main approaches: Reputation-based schemes where packets
are forwarded through the most reliable nodes, and Credit-
based schemes where packet-forwarding is dealt with as a
service that can be evaluated and charged. In our work we
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Fig. 1. Forwarding tree
have analyzed both schemes in order to find out whether they
are suitable for VANETs.
A. Why reputation based methods are not suitable?
An important characteristic of VANETs is the high mobility
of nodes. Taking into account such a parameter, it is impossible
to establish a reputation-based scheme because it is infeasible
to maintain historical information about peers’ behavior in a
VANET. This is because it is possible that two vehicles meet
just once in a long period of time, and it is very difficult to
listen whether a neighbor node actually forwards a packet.
B. Why classical credit based schemes are not suitable?
Incentive schemes have been proposed in order to solve
cooperation problems in MANETs. The so-called Packet Purse
Model where every source node puts a sum of money that it
considers enough to reach the destination has an overspending
problem because the source vehicle can not predict accurately
the global size of the required reward. Other known model is
the so-called Packet Trade Model where the destination node
pays the reward. In this case the model has problems because
source nodes can send all the packets they want as they have
not to pay for them. This model produces a network overload.
Consequently, we can conclude that none of both schemes are
a good solution for MANETs or for VANETs.
III. MAIN SCHEME
Figure 1 shows a typical packet forwarding process in
VANETs, here called Forwarding Tree. In such a figure several
important features of routing in VANETs are represented:
1) The root node corresponds to the source vehicle that first
sprays the message.
2) Each intermediate vehicle corresponds to one node in
the tree.
3) Each node ignores those packets that it had previously
received. Consequently, every vehicle is present just
once in every forwarding tree.
4) Each link in the tree corresponds to an encounter in the
vehicular network, which is associated with a timestamp
and the spatial coordinates indicating the position of the
vehicles.
According to the store-and-carry paradigm [7] [8], if an
intermediate vehicle stores a packet for a long time or actively
sprays the packet to other vehicles, the packet will be either
more likely to reach the intended destination, or to arrive
to more destinations, depending on the specific goal of the
routing. Therefore, by simply combining storage time and
number of sprays, we can define a useful contribution metric
for the intermediate vehicles. In order to stimulate intermediate
vehicles to contribute more, the source vehicle should reward
each intermediate vehicle according to its contribution.
Initially, the contribution Ci to packet forwarding of a node
i during the forwarding process may be modeled as a linear
convex combination balancing numbers of forwarding fi and
the period the packet is stored ti:
Ci = αti + (1− α)fi.
However, this basic model implies a constant share reward
R which is promised for the source node to each intermediate
node. This model may cause an overspending problem because
the source vehicle cannot guess in advance the total reward
since the number of nodes in the tree cannot be predicted
easily. Such a problem might be solved maintaining constant
the total reward and calculating the reward associated to each
intermediate node Ri after the packet reaches the destination
according to the following formula:
Ri =
R·Ci
C where C =
∑
i Ci
When the packet reaches the destination, each node i that
participated in the forwarding should report its contribution
Ci to the source. The final contribution C is calculated
through the sum of the partial contribution of each node in
the forwarding tree. Each intermediate node will receive Ri
as reward for forwarding. This model cannot be considered
neither a good solution because selfish nodes might prefer
keeping the packet rather than retransmitting it since they do
not know in advance how much they can earn for forwarding
and/or they might prefer not to share the reward. It happens
when an intermediate node forwards the packet to a non final
node because its proportional reward might decrease.
In our first proposal we incorporate several parameters to
be considered when dealing with rewarding. They are related
to information such as packet delivery deadline and number
of forwardings. In order to avoid that nodes prefer keeping the
packet rather than retransmitting it, we consider that a packet
should have a deadline depending on the characteristics of the
information contained. If the sent information is added-value
information, then the deadline will be longer, whilst if the
information is related to traffic safety, the deadline must be
very short due to the urgency of transferring the information.
The following notation is used to describe the parameters for
the computation of rewards:
• Packet delivery deadline Tj .
• Period tij that packet j is stored by node i.
• Number of forwardings fij of packet j by node i before
the deadline Tj .
• Balancing factor α
With these parameters we present our first proposal of
contribution function: Cij = α(tijTj) + (1 − α)fij where
α ∈ (0, 1).
In this first approach to the solution, the contribution of
node i for spreading packet j is proportional to the time tij
the packet is transported by the packet deadline Tj , and to
the number of the forwardings fij . By counting the number
of forwardings in this function, the objective is to encourage
nodes to forward packets and not to keep them without
forwarding them.
If the rate between time and deadline tij/Tj were consid-
ered as factor, when the message is urgent and the deadline
is short, the contribution would be higher. However in such
a case, once the time tij overpasses the deadline Tj , the
contribution still goes on increasing and even faster because
the proportional factor is greater than 1. This effect can be
corrected by using the inverse of the deadline so that the more
urgent the message, the greater the value 1/Tj . Therefore,
when the time that the packet is stored passes the deadline
the user contribution is no more increased. However, this is
neither a good solution because although the deadline has
been reached, the forwarding node continues getting a reward
although it is a small amount.
Our second proposal tries to solve these problems. We
propose a new contribution function in which three parameters
are used, which can be interesting both for the source node
and/or for the forwarding node. In particular we consider the
following additional notation to describe the parameters for
the computation of rewards:
• Distance dij between source and destination nodes when
the packet j is relayed by node i.
• Maximum distance Dj where the information in the
packet j is considered interesting by the receivers.
Each of the parameters considered in this convex function
has a balancing factor, represented by α1, α2 and α3. The
value that is assigned to each αi depends on the relevance
that the source node prefers to assign to each component
represented in the contribution function:
Cij = α1 Tj(1−e−tij )+α2 fij+α3 (−Dj(1−e−dij )+Dj)
where
3∑
k=1
αk = 1.
In the next subsections each part of this function is detailed,
and both the justification why they are used and the repercus-
sion they have in the contribution function are given.
A. Time
As discussed above, time is one of the most important
parameters when trying to assure that a packet reaches the
intended destination. If a vehicle stores a packet for a long
time, it could forward the package to more vehicles. However,
this parameter could produce a selfish behavior because a node
could prefer not to forward it and in this way not to share the
final reward with potential forwarding nodes. This effect is
avoided by considering in the proposed metric the component
associated to the following formula:
Tj(1− e−tij ).
This function corresponds to the Stokes formula, which
has a characteristic asymptotical behavior. This function is
intended to set a maximum time Tj that a node should store
one packet. Note that the value of contribution increases when
time increases. When tij reaches the threshold Tj , the growth
of contribution stops. In this way, a selfish behavior can be
Fig. 2. Contribution versus time and distance
avoided because if the time threshold is properly set, those
vehicles that retransmit the packet before the deadline will
have increased their contribution.
Note in the example of Figure 2 that the value of contri-
bution increases when the time increases, and that when tij
reaches the threshold Tj the contribution increase stops. In this
way, both selfish behavior and forwarding after deadline are
discouraged because vehicles that retransmit the packet before
deadline will have their contribution increased.
B. Forwarding
The second term in the proposed contribution metric is
related to the ultimate goal of our work. It deals with
measuring the forwarding of packets by each intermediate
node. This process is quite simple. It has not any restriction
such as maximum or minimum possible values. It consists of
increasing the contribution of node i to relay the packet j by:
fij .
According to this factor, the more the vehicles collaborate
in forwarding a packet, the bigger their final contribution is. In
the proposed function, this parameter is the one that increases
the contribution faster before the deadline. Consequently, the
balancing factor α2 must be higher than the other two factors
in order to encourage the forwarding of packets.
C. Distance
The evaluation of the effect of distance in the share reward-
ing process is the goal of the third term of the contribution
function. This term has been incorporated thinking that in
many cases information generated at a certain location is not
interesting out of a radius distance from than point. With this
idea in mind, when the vehicles go too far from the source of
the original packet, this value decreases.
For example, if we talk about an accident in a city center,
it has not sense that the message reaches a neighbor city.
Other possible situations where the same idea is applicable
is where the information is sent by a commercial centre, hotel
or restaurant, for instance.
This term is similar to the one related to time commented
in subsection III-A. The goal is to obtain a function with
asymptotical behavior that tends to zero when distance is near
to Dj . The value Dj is established by the source node. The
expression that models this behavior is:
−Dj(1− e−dij ) +Dj .
Figure 2 shows an example where as the vehicle moves
away from the source its contribution decreases, and when it
reaches certain point it nulls. In this way, the vehicle does not
get any benefit if it retransmits the packet outside the radio.
IV. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
In order to make a study of the proposal, several VANETs
simulations have been implemented in NS-2. The NS-2 simu-
lation parameters are the following: 15 nodes placed at random
in an area of 800m x 800m. The range of action of each node
is 100m. In each simulation, a node is randomly chosen and
it starts sending a packet to its neigbours, who send it to all
the nodes they meet inside their range of action. In Figure
3 we analyze the relationship among the rewards and the
different parameters of the contribution function. According
to the time plot, the scheme seems to send bigger rewards to
those nodes who store packets for longer. However, note that
these rewards are influenced by the number of forwards and
the distance between the source node and the nodes forwarding
the packet. In the forwards graph, the reward average increases
according to the number of forwards. Finally, in the distance
plot the scheme seems to give lower rewards to those nodes
whose distance increases according to the source node initial
position. For some nodes at a large distance, the reward
average increased due to that their spray was bigger than the
spray of the nodes in the same distance. This scheme provides
more reward to the nodes that effectively sprayed the packet
for a long time. Also according to Figure 4, the proposal
gives more reward to those nodes with higher contributions,
which are usually those nodes that have more descendents.
Consequently, cooperation among nodes is guaranteed thanks
to the proposal.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have seen that a simple adaptation of
known cooperation enforcement schemes defined originally
for MANETs is not adequate to incentivize cooperation in
VANETs. Consequently, we have proposed a new scheme
where incentives are defined by a convex function that de-
pends on different parameters. We have designed a metric for
contribution according to the characteristics of VANETs and
to parameters that are important both for source node and
for enforcing cooperation among nodes. We conclude from
our study that when designing these methods for distributing
a reward, the parameters to be taken into account should be
carefully assessed according to the network conditions.
Since this is a work in progress, many open questions exist
such as the the analysis of how can data associated to traffic
and weather conditions can be used in order to improve the
efficiency of the proposal.
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